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D R A F T

COMMENTS IN OPPOSITION TO PROPOSED POLICY GUIDANCE
ON MINORITY SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAMS

The National Women's Law Center submits these comments on
behalf of itself and the undersigned organizations regarding the
Department of Education's proposed policy guidance (PPG) on
minority scholarship

prog~ams.

In our view, the proposed policy

guidance is deeply flawed and should be withdrawn for the
following reasons.

First, in disregarding the pervasive

discrimination and underrepresentation suffered by racial
minorities in higher education and focusing solely on the
politically charged issue of "reverse discrimination," the policy
misconstrues the history and remedia.l nature of our civil rights
laws. Second, the policy ignores the very real problem of
widespread discrimination in college and university scholarship
programs against women and members of other protected groups.
Finally, in setting up different rules for scholarship programs
based on the source of funds within an institution for such
programs, the policy directly contravenes the clear meaning of
the Civil Rights Restoration Act and other principles of
coverage, thereby laying the groundwork for the wholesale
violation of the civil rights laws at issue.

Our interest as women's groups in this question is based on
three concerns.

First, we are deeply committed to the

eradication of all forms of discrimination and its effects, very
much including discrimination against racial minorities in higher
education.

Because targeted scholarship programs have been an

effective tool to combat the tragic history of racial
discrimination in this country and to enhance the access of
racial minorities to higher education, we strongly support their
continuation.

The dual discrimination faced by women of color

underscores our concern as well as the importance of the
principles at stake.

Second, many of the issues raised in the

PPG including the place of affirmative action in education, and
the misconstruction of the civil Rights Restoration Act and other
coverage principles such as "significant assistance," will
directly and deleteriously affect women's access to higher
education and to education in general.

This is because Title IX,

the principal federal law prohibiting sex discrimination in
education, is modeled on and construed similarly to Title VI
which is the legal basis for the PPG.

Finally, the proposed

policy's total disregard of the serious discrimination against
women in scholarship programs is both inexplicable and
inexcusable.

For all of these reasons, we urge the Department to

withdraw the proposed policy guidance and to address the real
problems of discrimination in higher education.
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I. The Civil Rights Laws Permit Education Institutions To Take
Voluntary. Affirmative Steps To Address The Underrepresentation
Of Protected Groups Without Requiring An Adjudication Of
Discrimination
In prohibiting voluntary race targeted affirmative action
scholarship programs, and limiting race targeted programs to
situations where there have been actual findings of
discrimination, the proposed policy guidance disregards the broad
remedial purposes underlying the civil rights acts within its
jurisdiction, including Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act and the Age Discrimination Act ("civil rights
acts'').

Indeed, the Department's own regulations specifically

authorize both remedial and affirmative action programs under
these statutes.
34 C.F.R.

§

See,

~'

34 C.F.R.

106.3 (Title IX).

§

100.3 (b) (6) (Title VI);

Under both regulatory schemes

recipients are specifically authorized, "in the absence of a
finding of discrimination" to "take affirmative action to
overcome the effects of conditions which resulted in limited
participation . . . by persons of a . . . "particular sex, race,
color or national origin. Id.
While the PPG acknowledges the regulation, it interprets it
to prohibit scholarship programs specifically targeted to address
the underrepresentation of members of the very groups protected
by the statutes. Instead it would permit only those scholarship
programs which enhance "diversity" within the university, with
3

diversity used in the most general sense of the term.

This

interpretation, which is accompanied by no analysis, would turn
the civil rights acts which were enacted to prohibit and redress
specific forms of pernicious discrimination into general, nearly
meaningless statements of support for the proposition that
universities benefit from having a broad range of students.

That

range, as contemplated by the PPG, includes minorities and women,
to be sure, but it also includes oboe players and students from
England.

This reading of 'Title VI is simply not supportable.

Moreover, it raises grave questions about the continued
vitality of any regulatory principle of affirmative action in
education.

As such, it has a chilling and deleterious effect,

not only on scholarship programs but on other exceedingly
important affirmative action programs designed to bring
minorities and women into disciplines in which they have been
historically underrepresented.

These include, for example,

programs to enhance the participation of girls and women in the
study of math, science and computer technologies.
Contrary to the position of the PPG, the principle of
voluntary, targeted affirmative action which is enunciated in
both the Title VI and Title IX regulations is well-grounded in
governing law. We incorporate by reference the excellent
discussion in the Statement of the NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, Inc. Opposing the Position of the Office of
Civil Rights On Minority Targeted Scholarships submitted in
response to the Department's May 30, 1991 request for comments
4

regarding the proper analysis of affirmative action to address
racial discrimination and underrepresentation.

Notwithstanding

the recent decision in Podberesky v. Kirwan, No. 91-2577 (4th

\.,

Cir. January 31, 1992), which will almost surely be appealed, we
believe that the NAACP LDF position is the correct one which will
ultimately be adopted by the courts.
We will take this ·opportunity to set out the legal authority

.

for affirmative action to address inequities facing women and
girls.

The Supreme Court laid out the framework for this

analysis in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718 (1982) where it addressed the question of whether Mississippi
could provide an all women's nursing school as part of its system
of higher education.

The Court held that, because nursing was a

traditionally female occupation which was dominated by women, the
exclusion of males constituted a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

However, the Court was careful to note that:

In limited circumstances, a gender-based classification
favoring one sex can be justified if it intentionally
and directly assists members of the sex that is
disproportionately burdened.
Id. at 728.

Indeed, the Court has consistently recognized that

providing benefits to women, but not to men, is permissible in
order to achieve a compensatory purpose. See,

~,

Califano v.

Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (statutory classification which
allowed women to eliminate more low-earning years than men in
computation of Social Security benefits upheld because of
workplace inequities); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498
(1975) (federal statute providing more time to female Naval

5

officers than to male Naval officers for promotion before
mandatory discharge permissible based on limitations on females'
service opportunities); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351
(1974) (upholding property tax exemption for widows but not
widowers to cushion disproportionately heavy economic impact of
spousal loss). See also Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480
U.S. 616 (1987).

In none of these cases was there an actual

finding of discrimination; rather, the Court based its decisions
on the view that distinctions favoring women were permissibly
based on societal discrimination and/or underrepresentation.
The record is clear that there are serious problems of
underrepresentation of racial minorities in higher education
generally, to say nothing of the extreme history of racial
discrimination in this country.

Moreover, women are the victims

of both historic discrimination and severe underrepresentation in
a variety of disciplines including, for example, math, science,
engineering and other technical areas.

Targeted scholarship --

and other -- programs designed to redress this discrimination and
expand opportunities are in full compliance with the governing
law and should be permitted.

II. The Proposed Policy Guidance Inexplicably And
Inexcusably Ignores The Serious Problem Of Discrimination Against
Women In Scholarship Programs
The proposed policy guidance raises the question of whether
it is a violation of the civil rights laws to target scholarship
6

resources to members of certain protected groups, particularly
racial minorities.

However, it inexplicably ignores the very

real problem of scholarship discrimination against members of
protected groups, including women and minorities, and in favor of
whites and males.

We find the Department's decision to devote

its first major statement in many years on the subject of
scholarship discrimination to "reverse discrimination .. to
represent a fundamentally wrong-headed policy.

We urge the

Department to re-examine its priorities and to put its resources
into eradicating discrimination against those for whom the
statutes were passed, and for whom the discrimination and the
ensuing burdens have long been documented but remain unremedied.
While in this discussion we are focusing on sexdiscrimination, it is equally important for the Department to
address discrimination against members of protected groups on the
basis of race and national origin under Title VI, disability
under Section 504, and age under the Age Discrimination Act.

The

enforcement of all of these statutes is squarely within the
Department's jurisdiction.

Yet, despite its clear-cut and long-

standing statutory obligations, the Department has largely
ignored discrimination in scholarship programs across-the-board.
Scholarship discrimination against women takes a variety of
forms.

To begin with, it includes scholarship programs which, on

their face, favor men.

Title IX regulations permit scholarship

programs
established pursuant to domestic or foreign wills,
trusts, bequests, or similar legal instruments or by
7

acts of a foreign government which require[) that
awards be made to members of a particular sex specified
therein; Provided, That the overall effect of the award
of such sex-restricted scholarships, fellowships, and
other forms of financial assistance does not
discriminate on the basis of sex.
34 C.F.R. § 106.37(b).
As originally proposed, the exception would have applied
only to financial aid "established under a foreign will, trust,
bequest, or similar legal instrument, or by a foreign
government."

Proposed

(June 20, 1974).

re~ulation

§

86.35, 39 Fed. Reg. 22236

According to the materials accompanying the

final regulation, the change in the rule which was eventually
promulgated was based 'on comments from "colleges and universities
claiming [that the stricter rule against sex-based scholarships
which had originally been proposed] would cause to 'dry-up' a
substantial portion of funds currently available for student
financial assistance made available through wills, trusts and
bequests which require that award be made to members of a
specified sex."

Preamble to the Title IX Regulations, Federal

Register, June 4, 1975, Reprinted in Sex Discrimination
Regulations, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Postsecondary
Education of the Committee on Education and Labor, House of
Representatives, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.

(1975) at 19.

No facts or

evidence were cited to support the claim that scholarship
assistance would "dry Up" if the original regulation were
promulgated and, to the best of our knowledge, there has been no
inquiry into this question since 1975.
In any event, regardless of the reasons underlying the
8

promulgation of this regulation over fifteen years ago, there is
absolutely no justification for the continued regulatory approval
of facially sex-discriminatory scholarships. We urge the
Department to demonstrate that it is serious about ending
scholarship discrimination by withdrawing this regulation.

For

the reasons discussed above, the only permissible sex-designated
scholarships are those which evince a compensatory purpose.

Such

a purpose could include, for example, expanding opportunities for
women to pursue studies in areas such as math, science,
engineering, computer and other technical programs in which they
have been historically underrepresented. It most assuredly does
not include honoring the discriminatory whim of a donor.
The problems underlying this regulation are only compounded
by the Department's lack of enforcement of the proviso.

To the

best of our knowledge, the Department has never investigated, let
alone enforced or provided policy guidance regarding, the
requirement that t,he "overall effect" of. sex-specific
scholarships be non-discriminatory.

There is no hard data

regarding the extent of sex-specific scholarship programs
although anecdotal evidence strongly suggests, as one would
expect, that these programs tilt heavily in favor of males. The
lack of enforcement of the proviso also strongly counsels against
extending this "principle" to the question of minority
scholarships.

There is no reason to believe that the Department

would -- or could -- assure that "overall equity" is achieved in
scholarships on the basis of race any more effectively than it
9

has done on the basis of sex.

To the contrary, fifteen years of

experience demonstrates that the concept is essentially
meaningless and unenforceable.
A second example of blatant scholarship discrimination
against women, and one which costs women at least tens of
millions of dollars every year, is discrimination in athletic
scholarship programs.

Athletic scholarships are allocated and

awarded on the explicit basis of sex.

While, again, data is

incomplete regarding the actual allocation of athletic
scholarship dollars, available evidence confirms that the lion's
share of these scholarship dollars are reserved for men only.
NCAA statistics confirm that women get barely a quarter of these
valuable scholarship dollars.

(Raiborn, 1990 at 37).

current Title IX regulations simply state that athletic aid
should be awarded "in proportion to the number of students of
each sex participating in . . . intercollegiate athletics.''
C.F.Ro

§

106.36 (c).

34

Despite repeated requests from groups

including the National Women's Law Center and the National
Coalition for Women and Girls in Education, and despite a number
of administrative complaints which have been filed with the
Office for civil Rights which have raised the issue of sex
discrimination in the allocation of athletic scholarships, the
Department has failed to take steps to combat this very serious
problem.
For example, it has refused to include discrimination
against women in the allocation of participation opportunities
10

or even meaningfully address participation discrimination which
has kept women at approximately 30% of college athletes for well
over ten years

in the analysis of scholarship discrimination.

This is in spite of the fact that given the linkage in the
regulation between participation and scholarship aid, addressing
discrimination in participation is absolutely crucial.

It is

also in spite of the fact that the one court to have addressed
the issue specifically held that discrimination in allocating
participation opportunities could not be used to justify
scholarship discrimination.

Haffer v. Temple University, 678 F.

Supp. 517, 539 (E.D. Pa. 1987).

In addition, the Department has

persisted in adhering to a highly technical statistical analysis
of "proportionality" which has the effect of permitting a college
or university to grant a substantially higher proportion of aid
to its male athletes than would be justified by a strict
numerical application of the proportionality standard.
If the Department is serious about ending scholarship
discrimination, the practice of earmarking ·approximately threequarters of all athletic scholarship dollars for men only must be
at the very top of the list.

At the same time, because of the

historic and pervasive discrimination against women in
intercollegiate athletics, the Department must take compensatory
steps to assure that female athletes receive a fair share of
these dollars.

It would be a blatant violation of Title IX to

allow institutions of higher education to adopt so-called sex
neutral criteria to keep in place a system which has
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systematically and very effectively denied women anything
resembling fair and equal treatment.
A final category of sex-based scholarship inequities stem
from scholarship practices which, unlike those just discussed,
are facially neutral but have a disparate impact on the basis of
sex.

Such "disparate impact" discrimination is clearly

prohibited by the civil rights laws, including Title IX.

The

Supreme Court first addressed the question in Guardians Ass'n v.
Civil Service Comm•n.,

46~

U.S. 582 (1983) where a majority held

that Title VI's regulations properly prohibit practices which
have the effect of discriminating on the basis of race or
national origin. The Court unanimously reaffirmed this holding
several years later in Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293-94
(1985). A majority of the circuits have since explicitly
recognized that a cause of action premised on the Title VI
regulations properly extends to disparate impact discrimination.
See, e.g., Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 981-82 (9th cir.
1984); Latinos Unidos de Chelsea v. Secretary of Housing, 799
F.2d 774, 785 n.20 (1st Cir. 1986); Craft v. Board of Trustees of
University of Illinois, 793 F.2d 140, 142 (7th Cir.) cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 829 (1986).
Title IX was expressly modeled on Title VI and is construed
accordingly. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 69596 (1979).

Title IX cases have followed Guardians and have

confirmed that Title IX also reaches disparate impact
discrimination.

Indeed, two of the leading Title IX cases have
12

specifically addressed sex discrimination in the award of
scholarships.

Most recently, in Sharif v. New York State

Department of Education, 709 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) Judge
Walker applied a disparate impact analysis to find that New
York's use of SAT scores to award state scholarships, which
resulted in a disparate impact against young women, constituted a
violation of Title IX.

Similarly, in Haffer v. Temple

University, 678 F. Supp. at 539-40 the court held that plaintiffs
did not have to show an intent to discriminate in order to
succeed on their claims of sex discrimination in the granting of
scholarships in Temple University's intercollegiate athletic
program.
While there is ample evidence of disparate impact
discrimination in the award of scholarships and financial aid,
the Department has failed to take any steps whatsoever to address
-- or even acknowledge -- the problem.

The inquiry starts very

close to home within the financial aid programs administered by
the Department of Education itself.

According to the just

published Fact Book On Women In Higher Education, American
Council On Education (1991),
[i)n all categories in which aid was awarded in fall
1986, women received on average fewer dollars than men.
The greatest discrepancy was in federal work-study
awards, where men received an average of 134% of what
women received ($1,621 for men compared to $1,211 for
women).
Id. at 113 (emphasis added).
Moreover, while male and female undergraduates received
about the same average amount in federal grants, "the average
13

nonf ederal grant for a man was 11% higher than for a woman
($2,046 compared to $1,848). Id.

As a result, "[i]n fall 1986,

an undergraduate man received an average of 7% more in total
financial aid than an undergraduate woman ($3,996 compared to
$3, 740)." Id.
Sex-based differences in financial assistance persist for
students pursuing doctoral studies. According to the American
Council on Education, "[f]rom 1978 on, a higher proportion of
women than men [has] used.their own earnings, spouse's earnings,
family contributions, and borrowings to support doctoral
studies." Id. at 114. The statistics demonstrate that women are
disproportionately consigned to the least advantageous mechanisms
for financing their doctoral studies.

For example, twenty-seven

percent of women took out Guaranteed Student Loans as compared to
only twenty-one percent of men. Id. Men, on the other hand,
disproportionately profit from the more prestigious and
advantageous financing mechanisms:
[t]he greatest overall discrepancy between women and
men in sources of support for doctoral studies between
1974 and 1987 occurred in the awarding of research
assistantships. In 1974, women received 12% fewer of
these awards than men; in 1985, they received 15%
fewer; and in 1987, 10% fewer.

To the best of our knowledge, the Department has never even
looked into the facts underlying these extremely troubling
statistics to determine whether discrimination is present.
Other scholarship programs which have a clear-cut disparate
impact on the basis of sex include programs which award
14

scholarships based on standardized test scores. A prime example
is the National Merit Scholarship program which uses the
Preliminary Scholastic Aptitude Test as the sole criterion for
determining its semi-finalist pool from which all scholarship
winners are selected.

Year-in and year-out, between 60% and 66%

of these prestigious scholarships -- totalling over $23 million
annually -- are awarded to young men. (Rosser, The SAT Gender
Gap: Identifying the Causes (1989) at 85).

Other scholarship

programs based on PSAT or SAT scores include, for example,
scholarships awarded by the states of New York, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Nevada and Rhode Island.

Despite the fact that

the only court to address the issue found that the use of SAT
scores to award scholarships constitutes sex discrimination in
violation of Title IX, Sharif v. New York State Department of
Education, 709 F. Supp. at 345, the Department of Education has
taken no steps whatsoever to address this problem.
In sum, the record is clear that there are serious problems
of sex discrimination in the award of scholarships in higher
education.

The record is also clear that the Department of

Education has done virtually nothing to address this
discrimination.

We find the Department's total disregard of sex

discrimination in the award of scholarships and financial aid -at the same time that it has chosen to expend substantial
resources on the issue of reverse discrimination in
scholarships -- to be both inexcusable and inexplicable.

15

III. The Proposed Policy Guidance Fails As A Matter Of Law
As It Incorrectly Interprets Both The Civil Rights Restoration
Act And The Principle of Significant Assistance
Finally, the proposed policy guidance seriously misconstrues
two key aspects of the governing law as it seeks to carve out an
exception to permit colleges to "administer private donor raceexclusive scholarships (a scholarship where the private donor
restricts eligibility to students of designated races or national
origins) where that aid does not limit the amount, type or terms
of financial aid available to any student."

The proposed

distinction between "private donor race exclusive scholarships"
which are "administered" by the institution and scholarships
which are funded by the institution -- which is presented without
explanation or legal justification -- is in direct contravention
of both the Civil Rights Restoration Act (CRRA) passed by
Congress in 1988 and the well-established principle that
recipients may not circumvent the civil rights laws by extending
significant assistance to an entity which discriminates.

A. The Civil Rights Restoration Act
Congress passed the CRRA to reverse the Supreme Court's
decision in Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984) which
held that the civil rights acts' prohibitions against
discrimination applied only to the particular programs and
activities funded by federal dollars.

The CRRA clarified that

these laws prohibit discrimination in all activities of an
16

education institution which receives any federal funds, whether
or not such funds flow to the particular activity at issue.

It

states in pertinent part:
For the purposes of this title, the term "program or
activity" and "program" mean all of the operations of-

* * or
* other post-secondary
(2) (A) A college, university,
institution, or a public system of higher education;
(emphasis added).
Congress' intent in framing this language is crystal clear.
As the Senate Report explains:
The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 amends each of
the affected statutes by adding a sectio~ defining the
phrase "program or activity" and "program" to make
clear that discrimination is prohibited throughout
entire agencies or institutions if any part receives
Federal financial assistance. . . . For education
institutions, the bill provides that where federal aid
is extended anywhere within a college, university, or
public system of higher education, the entire
institution or system is covered.
Sen. Rep. No. 100-64, lOOth Cong. 1st Sess. (1987) at 4 (emphasis
added).

Accordingly, if it is a violation of the civil rights

acts for a recipient institution to fund a race exclusive
scholarship with its own funds, it necessarily follows that it is
a violation of these laws to fund such a scholarship with private
funds.
While the Department's effort to insulate "private donor"
funds from its ban on race specific scholarships may serve the
short-term purpose of preserving at least some of these
scholarships, it has a long-term deleterious effect on the
enforcement of the civil rights acts.

This is based on the fact

that by excluding "private donor funds" which are nonetheless
17

"administered" by the institution from the requirements of those
laws, it creates a blueprint for avoiding the clear statutory
prohibitions against discrimination in the four statutes at
issue.

If all an institution has to do to circumvent the divil

rights laws is to obtain private funding for an activity in which
it seeks to discriminate,

w~

are returned to a reading of those

laws which is even more restrictive and contrary to congressional
intent than that encompassed i? the discredited Grove City
College decision.

Indeed, in Grove-. city Colleg.e itself, the

Court held that· the entire scholarship program was covered
because of the government-funded scholarships which its students
received.
Accordingly, we must vigorously pr9test the Department's
theory for preserving some racially-targeted scholarships over
the short-term but which will fundamentally undermine the
enforcement of the civil

righ~s

taw·s over the .lc>ng-term.

The

Department has no authority to differentiate between an
institution's civil rights obligations based on the source of
funds at issue.

We respectfully request·that it comply with the

clear meaning of the Civil Rights Restoration Act.

B. Significant Assistance
·The related. concept .of .-"significant assist~nce 1 ' is -also
implicated by the PPG's endorsement ·of an instit'ution's ability
to administer "private" race exclusive scholarship funds.

The

significant assistance principle bars institutions from engaging
18

in "shell games" to shift discriminatory activities to entities
not themselves covered under the civil rights acts, and thereby
shield the institution's dirty business of discrimination.

While

the short-term purpose of the exception in the PPG for private
donor funds may appear attractive in that it permits private
donors to designate scholarship funds in a race exclusive manner,
in the long-term it fundamentally undermines the broader, very
important principle.

.

Under the Title IX regulations recipients are prohibited
from "providing significant assistance to any agency,
organization or person which discriminates on the basis of sex in
providing any aid, benefit, or service to students or employees."
34 C.F.R.

§

106.31(b) (6).

In the leading litigation regarding

this regulation, the former fifth circuit interpreted it broadly
to bar a University from having any relation with an honor
society which admitted men only.

Iron Arrow Honor Society v.

Heckler, 702 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1983), dismissed as moot, 464
U.S. 67 {1983).
Title IX's financial aid regulations are even more specific.
They prohibit a recipient from: "through solicitation, listing,
approval, provision of facilities or other services, assist any
foundation, trust, agency,

organization~

or person which provides

assistance to any of such recipient's students in a manner which
discriminates on the basis of sex." 34 C.F.R.
also 34 C.F.R.

§

§

106.37(a) (2). See

100.3 (b) (4) (under Title VI prohibited

discrimination in financial aid includes "benefits provided in or
19

through a facility provided with the aid of Federal financial
assistance.") (emphasis added).
If an institution's administration of private donor
restricted scholarships does not constitute significant
assistance within the meaning of these regulations, there is
nothing at all left to the principle.

By so weakening the

concept of significant assistance, the Department is, in effect,
providing institutions with a blueprint of how to circumvent antidiscrimination requirements.

There is no analytical difference

between the practices authorized by the PPG in this regard and
institutions which, for example, set up and expand "private"
booster clubs to fund men's athletics programs but not women's,
reinstitute all-male honor societies which are nominally run by
their alumni and not the institution, and "contract out" the
operation of housing facilities to permit superior accommodations
to continue to be offered to young men.
We urge the Department to reject out of hand this approach and
retain the broad prohibition of discrimination which is properly
based in current law.

Conclusion
For the above stated reasons, we urge the Department not to
promulgate the PPG as a final regulation.

Instead, the Department

should reinforce the longstanding principle that recipients are
permitted to take race, sex, national origin, age and disability
into account in order to address the underrepresentation of
20

protected groups in the academic community as well as historic
discrimination against members of these groups.

Moreover, the

Department should devote its resources to eradicating the very real
discrimination which continues to keep women and minorities from
full and equal participation in academia.
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